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This paper is about two requirements on wish reports whose interaction
motivates a novel semantics for these ascriptions. The first require-
ment concerns the ambiguities that arise when determiner phrases,
e.g. definite descriptions, interact with ‘wish’. More specifically, sev-
eral theorists have recently argued that attitude ascriptions featuring
counterfactual attitude verbs license interpretations on which the de-
terminer phrase is interpreted relative to the subject’s beliefs. The
second requirement involves the fact that desire reports in general re-
quire decision-theoretic notions for their analysis. The current study is
motivated by the fact that no existing account captures both of these
aspects of wishing. I develop a semantics for wish reports that makes
available belief-relative readings but also allows decision-theoretic no-
tions to play a role in shaping the truth conditions of these ascrip-
tions. The general idea is that we can analyze wishing in terms of a
two-dimensional notion of expected utility.
Our topic is the nature of our mental states, and the meaning of proposi-
tional attitude reports. There has recently been a considerable amount of
work in two areas: (i) developing accounts of desire ascriptions, e.g. reports
of the form pS wants pq; and (ii) developing theories of counterfactual atti-
tude reports, e.g. imagination reports of the form pS imagines pq.1 In this
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paper, I aim to contribute to both of these areas by focusing on a construc-
tion that lies at their intersection, namely counterfactual wish reports, i.e.
ascriptions of the form pS wishes pq.
More specifically, this paper is about two requirements on wish reports whose
interaction motivates a novel semantics for these ascriptions. The first re-
quirement concerns the ambiguities that arise when determiner phrases, e.g.
definite descriptions, interact with ‘wish’. Philosophers and linguists have
long maintained that attitude reports generally give rise to the de dicto/de
re ambiguity. However, several theorists have recently argued that this dis-
tinction isn’t exhaustive. They show that some attitude reports exhibit a
three-way ambiguity. More specifically, attitude ascriptions featuring coun-
terfactual attitude verbs—e.g. ‘wish’, ‘suppose’, ‘imagine’, and ‘dream’—
allow not just for de dicto and de re construals, but also interpretations on
which the determiner phrase is interpreted relative to the subject’s beliefs.
For instance, Blumberg (2018) provides the following case:
Burgled Bill : Bill wakes up to find a trail of muddy footprints
leading to his study. Fearing the worst, he runs to his study
to check on his safe. He discovers the safe door open, and the
safe emptied of its contents. His valuable collection of silverware
is nowhere to be found. Given all of the evidence, Bill is quite
certain that he’s been burgled. As it happens, Bill wasn’t robbed.
His partner removed the silverware from the safe so that it could
be cleaned; and the muddy footprints belonged to Bill—he made
them unknowingly the night before.
(1) Bill wishes that the person who robbed him had never robbed any-
one.
(1) has a true reading in this scenario. However, it can be shown that this
reading corresponds to neither the de dicto nor de re construal.2 Instead,
the relevant reading is intuitively one where the definite description ‘the
person who robbed Bill’ is interpreted relative to Bill’s beliefs. On this
construal, the report can be roughly paraphrased as follows: ‘Bill wishes
that the person who he thinks robbed him had never robbed anyone’. The
first requirement on an adequate theory of wish reports, then, is that it be
able be able to capture belief-relative readings of these ascriptions.
2019; Jerzak, 2019; Phillips-Brown, Forthcoming; Blumberg & Hawthorne, forthcomingb,f;
Blumberg, forthcoming). Recent work on counterfactual attitudes includes (Ninan, 2008;
Yanovich, 2011; Maier, 2015; Ninan, 2016; Blumberg, 2018; Pearson, 2018; Liefke & Wern-
ing, 2021; Liefke, forthcoming).
2See §1 for discussion.
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The second requirement involves the fact that desire reports in general re-
quire decision-theoretic notions for their analysis. This can be illustrated by
considering an example inspired by Levinson (2003):
Insurance Want : Sue is deciding whether to take out house in-
surance. She estimates that the chances of her house burning
down are 11000 . But the results would be calamitous: she’d lose
her home which is valued at $1, 000, 000. Comprehensive home
insurance would cost her $100. Sue has a meeting with her in-
surance broker this afternoon, so she needs to decide what she
wants to do.
(2) Sue wants to buy insurance.
If Sue is like most of us, (2) is true: even though she thinks it’s likely that
her house won’t burn down, there is a small possibility that it does, and the
badness of this possibility outweighs the cost of buying insurance. We can
construct similar examples involving wish reports:
Insurance Wish: Sue met with her broker, but they spent the
whole time discussing Sue’s life insurance policy. Sue forgot to
bring up the issue of home insurance. The broker is going on a
month-long holiday and won’t be available for consultations.
(3) Sue wishes she had bought house insurance.
Again, if Sue is like most of us, (3) is true: even though it is highly likely
that Sue would have wasted money had she bought home insurance, it is
still reasonable for her to rue her missed opportunity, given the costs of a
potential fire.
So, an adequate semantics for wish reports needs to be able to generate
belief-relative readings, in order to handle ascriptions such as (1), and it
must be decision-theoretic, in order to handle reports such as (3). The
current study is motivated by the fact that no existing account achieves
both of these goals. On the one hand, existing decision-theoretic accounts
of wanting maintain that S wants p just in case the expected value of p,
for S, outweighs the expected value of ¬p. Expected value is defined in
terms of conditional subjective probability (Jeffrey, 1965). However, since
subjects can wish for things that they believe to be false, the expected value
of objects wished true will be undefined. Thus, existing decision theoretic
accounts can’t even handle (3), let alone (1).
On the other hand, existing accounts of belief-relative readings aren’t
decision-theoretic. Consequently, these theories predict that, e.g. (3) will
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be false in context. Moreover, these accounts can’t easily be tweaked to
capture such cases. Indeed, there appears to be a considerable challenge in
trying marry the insight driving theories of belief-relative counterfactual at-
titudes with decision theory. The key idea on this approach to counterfactual
attitude reports is that the internal argument to, e.g. ‘wish’ is “two dimen-
sional”. This is usually spelled out by maintaining that the embedded clause
denotes a set of pairs of worlds, or a function from worlds to sets of worlds,
rather than just a set of worlds. These objects are called two-dimensional
intensions (Ninan, 2008), or paired propositions (Blumberg, 2018). So, for
instance, on the relevant reading of (1), the meaning of the complement can
be represented as follows:
Meaning of the complement in (1):
p∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who robbed Bill in
w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
The challenge is to come up with a notion suitably related to expected value
that is defined relative to such two-dimensional entities.
The primary aim of this paper is to show that this challenge can be met. I
develop a semantics for wish reports that employs paired propositions, but
also allows decision-theoretic notions to play a role in shaping the truth
conditions of these ascriptions. The general idea is that we can analyze
wishing in terms of a notion of expected utility, where instead of appealing
to a subject’s conditional credence, we appeal to their subjunctive, or coun-
terfactual credence. More specifically, I’ll make use of the notion of revising
a probability function through the process of imaging. Roughly, imaging a
probability function by a proposition p moves probability mass from worlds
in which p is false, to the most similar worlds in which p is true. This means
that even if a probability function C assigns some proposition p zero prob-
ability, the image of C on p (denoted Cp) can assign p non-zero probability
(in fact, Cp(p) = 1 so long as p isn’t a contradiction). For instance, even
though Sue’s subjective probability of buying insurance in the Insurance 2
scenario is 0, the image of Sue’s probability function on the proposition that
she bought insurance assigns this same proposition non-zero probability (in
fact, the imaged function assigns this proposition probability 1). As I show,
this allows us to capture (3).
As standardly presented, the imaging operation over probability functions
is only defined relative to propositions, i.e. sets of worlds. So, in order
to handle reports such as (1), I extend this notion by allowing functions
to be imaged relative to paired propositions. As we will see, some care
is required in formulating this operation. But the overall result yields an
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elegant semantics for wish reports that is able to capture both the decision-
theoretic aspects of desire as well as the belief-relativity of counterfactual
attitudes.
The paper is structured as follows. In §1 I present the basic ideas un-
derlying two-dimensional approaches to counterfactual attitudes, and argue
that existing proposals can’t capture the ways in which wishes interact with
subjective probability. Then in §2 I discuss existing decision-theoretic ap-
proaches to non-counterfactual desire, e.g. wanting, and show that these
don’t carry over to counterfactual wishing. In §3 I develop my positive ac-
count of wish reports that makes use of a revised, two-dimensional notion
of imaging. Finally, §4 concludes by discussing the relationship between
wishing and desire reflection principles.
1 Belief-relative desire
In this section, I show that existing approaches to belief-relative desire
ascriptions, namely the two-dimensional Hintikkian account (Maier, 2015)
and the two-dimensional comparative desirability account (Blumberg, 2018),
cannot handle insurance cases. I begin by presenting some background on
belief-relative readings of counterfactual attitudes (§1.1). Then I present
each account (§§1.2-1.3), and argue that neither approach is sufficiently sen-
sitive to subjective probabilities (§1.4).
1.1 Two-dimensional content
To a first approximation, Φ is a counterfactual attitude so long as a sub-
ject can coherently believe ¬p but still be in a Φ-state with the content p
(putting Frege puzzles to one side). Thus, wishing, imagining, dreaming,
and supposing are all counterfactual attitudes. For instance, ‘Sue wishes
that she had bought insurance’ can be true even when Sue is certain that
she didn’t buy insurance.3
Philosophers and linguists have long maintained that there are ambiguities
that arise when determiner phrases, e.g. definite descriptions, interact with
3There are uses of ‘wish’ that are not counterfactual, e.g. when the verb takes a
non-finite clause in ‘I wish to play tennis later’. It means something closer to ‘hope’ in
examples like this. It is an interesting question how exactly these two types of wish report
are related, but not one that I can take up at any length here. I’ll just note that the
“counterfactuality” of finite-clause embedding ‘wish’ seems to come from its additional
layer of “fake past tense”, e.g. ‘I wish I had a car’ means that I have a desire to possess
a car now. Thus, a promising approach to trying to explain the counterfactual aspect of
finite-clause embedding ‘wish’ could look to accounts of fake tense (Iatridou, 2000; Schulz,
2014; Mackay, 2019).
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attitude verbs. In particular, it is generally assumed that attitude reports
give rise to the de dicto/de re ambiguity. The basic observation here goes
back at least to Quine (1956). Quine argued that a sentence such as (4) can
mean different things. On the one hand, it can report a fairly trivial belief
of Ralph’s. This is the de dicto reading, and is given in (4a). On the other
hand, it can report that Ralph could have some information that would be
valuable to the authorities. This is the de re reading, and is given in (4b).
(4) Ralph believes that someone is a spy.
a. Ralph believes that there are spies.
b. Someone is such that Ralph believes they are a spy.
However, several theorists have argued that the de dicto/de re distinction
isn’t exhaustive.4 They show that some attitude reports exhibit a three-way
ambiguity. More specifically, attitude ascriptions featuring counterfactual
attitude verbs allow not just for de dicto and de re construals, but also
interpretations on which the determiner phrase is interpreted relative to the
subject’s beliefs.5 This is known as the de credito reading (Yanovich, 2011).
To illustrate, let us repeat the case from Blumberg (2018):
Burgled Bill : Bill wakes up to find a trail of muddy footprints
leading to his study. Fearing the worst, he runs to his study
to check on his safe. He discovers the safe door open, and the
safe emptied of its contents. His valuable collection of silverware
is nowhere to be found. Given all of the evidence, Bill is quite
certain that he’s been burgled. As it happens, Bill wasn’t robbed.
His wife removed the silverware from the safe so that it could be
cleaned; and the muddy footprints belonged to Bill—he made
them unknowingly the night before.
(1) Bill wishes that the person who robbed him had never robbed any-
one.
(1) has a true reading in this scenario.6 However, the report cannot be read
de re since a natural de re paraphrase of (1) is ‘a unique person robbed Bill
4In fact, it’s been known since at least (Fodor, 1979) that this distinction isn’t exhaus-
tive. However, Fodor’s readings won’t be relevant in what follows, since in the cases at
issue, they collapse into the de re construal.
5See, for example (Ninan, 2008, 2016; Yanovich, 2011; Maier, 2015, 2016, 2017; Blum-
berg, 2018; Pearson, 2018; Liefke & Werning, 2021).
6If this reading is difficult to access because (1) seems to require that there actually
be someone who robbed Bill, then consider ‘Bill thinks that someone robbed him, and
he wishes that the person who robbed him had never robbed anyone’. This sentence is
acceptable, and in no way suggests that Bill was robbed; but its second conjunct raises
exactly the same issues as (1).
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and Bill wishes that they had never robbed anyone’. This can’t be true for
the simple reason that nobody robbed Bill. As for the de dicto reading of
the report, it is equivalent to ‘Bill wishes that a unique person robbed him
and never robbed anyone’. This has Bill wishing something that is obviously
logically incoherent, which badly misrepresents the content of Bill’s attitude.
Instead, the relevant reading is one where the definite description ‘the person
who robbed Bill’ is interpreted relative to Bill’s beliefs. On this construal,
the report can be roughly paraphrased as follows: ‘Bill wishes that the
person who he thinks robbed him had never robbed anyone’. This is the de
credito reading of the ascription.
As mentioned earlier, theories that try to capture de credito readings of
counterfactual attitude reports maintain that the objects of these attitudes
are in a certain sense “two-dimensional”. These objects are usually rep-
resented by building on the possible worlds approach to semantic content.
On the standard possible worlds framework, propositions are represented by
sets of possible worlds, or equivalently functions from worlds to truth-values.
The proposition expressed by a sentence is the set of worlds in which that
sentence is true, e.g. the meaning of ‘Harry is a doctor’ is the proposition
that contains all and only worlds in which Harry is a doctor.
Theories of de credito readings build on this approach by maintaining that
the objects of counterfactual attitudes aren’t propositions, i.e. sets of worlds,
but rather sets of pairs of worlds, or equivalently functions from worlds to
sets of worlds. Following Blumberg (2018), we will call these objects paired
propositions. The rough idea is that when a subject bears a counterfactual
attitude to a paired proposition p∗, then where w′ is a world compatible with
the subject’s beliefs, p∗(w′) represents the subject’s attitude “relative to”
their beliefs. It is worth being explicit about terminology: I will only ever
use the term ‘proposition’ to mean a set of worlds; and I will only ever use
the term ‘paired proposition’ to mean a set of pairs of worlds, i.e. a function
from worlds to sets of worlds. As for notation, I will represent propositions
with italicized lower-case letters, e.g. p, q, r, etc; and I will represent paired
propositions with a superscripted ∗: p∗, q∗, r∗, etc. always stand for paired
propositions.
Since our central concern is with developing a semantics for wish reports,
in the main text I won’t discuss how paired propositions can be represented
syntactically at logical form. But the interested reader can consult the ap-
pendix for a fairly straightforward account. For our purposes, it will suffice
to outline which kind of paired proposition is associated with each construal
of a counterfactual attitude report. The idea is that de dicto and de re con-
struals are captured by constant functions, i.e. functions that take any world
to the same set of worlds. For instance, the paired proposition expressed by
the complement on the de dicto reading of (1) can be represented as follows
(this paired proposition is denoted by d∗):
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Meaning of complement on de dicto reading of (1):
d∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who robbed Bill in
w′′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
Clearly, this function takes any world to the empty set. This is supposed
to explain why the de dicto reading of (1) represents an incoherent wish of
Bill’s.
As for the paired proposition expressed by the complement on the de re
reading of (1), it can be represented as follows (this paired proposition is
denoted by r∗):
Meaning of complement on de re reading of (1):
r∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who robbed Bill in
w@, and this individual never robs anyone in w
′′}
w@ represents the actual world. So, this function takes any world to the set
of worlds w′′ such that the person who actually robbed Bill never robs Bill
in w′′. Since nobody actually robbed Bill, this is supposed to explain why
the de re reading of (1) can’t be true.
Finally, the meaning of the complement on the target de credito reading can
be expressed as follows (this paired proposition is denoted by c∗):
Meaning of complement on de credito reading of (1):
c∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who robbed Bill in
w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
Note that c∗ is not a constant function: if w1 and w2 differ as to who robs
Bill at these worlds, then c∗(w1) and c
∗(w2) will be distinct. For instance,
if Joe robs Bill at w1, then c
∗(w1) is the set of worlds where Joe never robs
anyone. And if Steve robs Bill at w2, then c
∗(w2) is the set of worlds where
Steve never robs anyone. As we’ll see below, it is precisely this variation in
the output of c∗ that is used to capture the de credito reading of (1).
Hopefully the reader now has a better sense of what it means for accounts
of counterfactual attitudes to be “two-dimensional”. Next I turn to some
semantics for wish reports in this vein.
1.2 The Hintikkian account
In order to handle de credito readings of desire ascriptions, Maier (2015)
builds on the notion of belief-relative imagining developed by Ninan (2008).7
7Ninan’s semantics has also been taken up by Yanovich (2011) and Pearson (2018).
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Maier’s account can ultimately be understood as a two-dimensional variant
of the classic Hintikka-style approach to attitude reports.
On Hintikka’s (1962) semantics, attitude verbs are given a quantificational
semantics involving a lexically-determined accessibility relation. For ex-
ample, ‘believe’ denotes a relation that holds between an agent S and a
proposition p just in case every world compatible with what S believes is
one in which p is true, i.e. a p-world. This set of worlds compatible with
everything the subject believes is the subject’s belief set, and is denoted by
Doxw,S . Similarly, on Hintikka-style semantics for desire verbs, subjects are
assigned a set of “ideal worlds” compatible with their desires.8
On Maier’s semantics, each subject S in a world w is assigned a paired
proposition Bul∗w,S whose domain includes at least S’s belief set in w. Bul
∗
w,S
is supposed to represent S’s “belief-relative” desires in w: when w′ ∈ Doxw,S ,
then w′′ ∈ Bul∗w,S(w′) iff w′′ is compatible with what S desires in w relative
to w′.
Maier maintains that the notion of a world being compatible with what a
subject desires “relative to” one of her belief worlds must ultimately be taken
as a primitive. However, he also gives it the following “counterfactual” gloss
(220):9
The new primitive notion Bul∗, describing an agent’s “belief-
relative buletic alternatives”, requires some explanation...The
motivation for the extra [world] parameter is that we need our
model to give us a set of buletic alternatives relative to what the
agent believes. More precisely, Bul∗w,S(w
′) is the set of [worlds]
compatible with what the agent S in w would desire if her belief
set were the singleton {w′}...Imagine you’re agent S at w. Let
w′ be one of your doxastic alternatives. Now imagine that w′
is your only doxastic alternative, i.e., you’re convinced that you
inhabit context w′—free of any uncertainty. In that situation,
if you consider a w′′ to be compatible with your desires, then
w′′ ∈ Bul∗w,S(w′).
Maier’s semantics can be represented as follows (note that JpK denotes a
paired proposition, and so JpK(w) denotes a proposition):10
8See (von Fintel, 1999) and (Crnič, 2011) for examples of this sort of approach to desire
ascriptions.
9Maier uses contexts, rather than worlds, as the intensional parameter in his account.
Since the considerations that motivate using contexts rather than worlds are orthogonal
to our present concerns, where Maier talks about contexts, I’ve replaced this with talk of
worlds.
10This is a static version of Maier’s semantics. His original account is set in a dynamic
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2D Hintikkian semantics for wish
JS wishes pKw = True iff for all w′ in Doxw,S : Bul∗(w′)w,S ⊆
JpK(w′)
Let us focus on the de credito reading of (1) (‘Bill wishes that the person
who robbed him had never robbed anyone’). Recall that on this reading,
the complement of the report expresses the following paired proposition:
Meaning of complement on de credito reading of (1):
c∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who robbed Bill in
w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
Then (1) is true (on its de credito reading) at w@ just in case for every one of
Bill’s belief worlds w′, and every world w′′ compatible with what Bill desires
at w@ relative to w
′, the person who robbed Bill in w′ never robs anyone
in w′′. Using Maier’s counterfactual gloss on belief-relative desire we can
also express these conditions as follows: (1) is true at w@ just in case for
each of Bill’s belief worlds w′: if Bill was certain that he inhabited w′, then
every world w′′ compatible with what he would desire would be one where
the person who robbed Bill in w′ never robs anyone in w′′.
To make these truth-conditions a bit clearer, suppose that in the Burgled
Bill scenario, Bill thinks that either Joe or Steve robbed him, but he isn’t
sure which. Then Bill’s belief set can be represented by two worlds: w1, a
world where Joe robs him, and w2, a world where Steve robs him. In this
case, (1) is true at w@ iff if Bill was certain that w1 was the actual world,
then every world compatible with what he desires would be one where Joe
never robs anyone; and if Bill was certain that w2 was the actual world,
then every world compatible with what he desires would be one where Steve
never robs anyone.
1.3 The comparative desirability account
Unlike Maier, Blumberg doesn’t build on a Hintikka-style account of the
attitudes. Instead, Blumberg takes inspiration from Heim’s (1992) theory
of “comparative desirability” (which was in turn influenced by Stalnaker
(1984)). The general idea on this approach is that desire reports are true
when subjects prefer the most similar worlds in which the thing being desired
framework (a variant of Discourse Representation Theory), since he tries to model pre-
supposition projection patterns involving attitude verbs. It is also worth mentioning that
Maier doesn’t provide a semantics specifically for wish reports. Instead, he provides a
“proto semantics” that is intended to capture the common features of desire reports in
general.
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holds to the most similar worlds in which it does not. By employing paired
propositions, Blumberg allows the object of desire to vary with each of the
subject’s belief worlds that is being considered.
To make this precise, it is assumed that a subject’s desires generate a
preference ordering over possible worlds: for any subject S and world w :
w′ >w,S w
′′ iff w′ is more desirable to S in w than w′′. >w,S is a strict
partial order. This ordering over worlds is then “lifted” to an ordering over
sets of worlds as follows: X ⊆W , Y ⊆W : X >S,w Y iff w′ >S,w w′′ for all
w′ ∈ X, w′′ ∈ Y .
Comparative desirability accounts also make use of a similarity function
Simw(·). Intuitively, this function maps propositions to propositions, and
takes each proposition p to the set of worlds maximally similar to w in which
p is true. This function is assumed to obey the following constraints:
Constraints on Simw(·)
Success: Simw(p) ⊆ p
Strong Centering : Simw(p) = {w}, if w ∈ p
Uniformity : If Simw(p) ⊆ q and Simw(q) ⊆ p, then Simw(p) =
Simw(q)
Blumberg’s account can be expressed as follows (note again that JpK denotes
a paired proposition, and so JpK(w) denotes a proposition):11
2D comparative desirability semantics for wish
JS wishes pKw = True if and only if for each w′ in Doxw,S :
Simw′(JpK(w′)) >w,S Simw′(JpK(w′))
Again, let us focus on the de credito reading of (1). (1) (on its de credito
construal) is true at w@ just in case for each of Bill’s belief worlds w
′, a
unique person robbed Bill at w′, and Bill prefers the worlds most similar
to w′ in which the person who robbed Bill at w′ never robs anyone, to the
worlds most similar to w′ in which the person who robbed Bill at w′ robs
someone. Given Strong Centering, and the fact that Bill thinks that he was
robbed, these truth-conditions can be simplified: (1) is true at w@ just in
case for each of Bill’s belief worlds w′: every world w′′ that is maximally
similar to w′ in which the person who robbed Bill at w′ never robs anyone
is such that Bill prefers w′′ to w′ at w@.
To make these truth-conditions a bit clearer, suppose again that Bill’s belief
set is comprised of two worlds: w1, where Joe robs Bill, and w2, where Steve
11I use overbar notation to denote the set complement operation.
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robs him. Then (1) is true at w@ iff Bill prefers the most similar worlds to
w1 in which Joe never robs anyone to w1, and Bill prefers the most similar
worlds to w2 in which Steve never robs anyone to w2.
1.4 Probability and desire
The accounts of belief-relative desire that we considered in §§1.2-1.3 are so-
phisticated, and it is arguable that they are able to handle the range of cases
that motivated their development. However, these semantics can’t capture
the ways in which desire reports are sensitive to subjective probability. To
illustrate, consider (3) in the Insurance Wish scenario once again:
Insurance Wish: Sue met with her insurance broker, but they
spent the whole time discussing Sue’s life insurance policy. Sue
forgot to bring up the issue of home insurance. Sue estimates
that the chances of her house burning down are 11000 . But the
results would be calamitous: she’d lose her home which is valued
at $1, 000, 000. Comprehensive home insurance would have cost
her $100. Unfortunately, Sue’s broker is going on a month-long
holiday and won’t be available for consultations.
(3) Sue wishes she had bought house insurance.
If Sue is like most of us, (3) is true: even though she thinks it’s (over-
whelmingly) likely that insurance wouldn’t be needed, the enormous cost
of a fire destroying her home makes it reasonable for her to rue her missed
opportunity.
But it is difficult to see how (3) can be true on either of the semantics
discussed above. We may assume that the meaning of the complement in
(3) is a constant function from worlds to the proposition that Sue buys
insurance:12
Meaning of the complement in (3):
s∗(w′) = {w′′ | Sue buys insurance in w′′}
We can represent Sue’s belief set by two worlds: w1, a world where a fire
occurs, and w2, a world where no fire occurs. On the Hintikkian account,
12Pronouns in the scope of counterfactual attitude verbs do also exhibit “de credito”
construals, e.g. ‘Bill thinks a woman robbed him, and he wishes that she had never robbed
anyone’. But in the case of (3), the “de credito” construal is essentially equivalent to the
construal that we assume below.
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(3) is true just in case for each of Sue’s belief worlds w′: if Sue was certain
that she inhabited w′, then she would desire that she had bought insurance.
Thus, (3) is true only if were Sue certain that she inhabited w2, she would
desire that she had bought insurance. But this isn’t the case: if Sue knew
that there would be no fire, then buying insurance would certainly be a
waste of money, and she would not want to buy insurance. Of course, this
construal of the truth-conditions of (3) relies on Maier’s counterfactual gloss
of the notion of “belief relative” desire alternatives. But I submit that on
any reasonable understanding of this notion, the report will come out false.
As for the comparative desirability account, (3) is true just in case for each
of Sue’s belief worlds w′: every world w′′ that is maximally similar to w′
in which Sue buys insurance at w′ is such that Sue prefers w′′ to w′. So,
(3) is true only if Sue prefers the most similar worlds to w2 in which she
buys insurance, to w2. But again this isn’t the case: the closest worlds
to w2 in which Sue buys insurance are worlds where Sue wastes money,
since no fires occur there. So, Sue does not prefer these worlds to w2.
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This argument assumes that the most similar worlds to w2 are ones where
Sue buys insurance, and nothing else relevant to her preference ordering
occurs. That the similarity function is configured this way in the Insurance
2 scenario is supported by the fact that sentences such as those in (5) are
also true in context:
(5) a. Sue thinks that if she had bought insurance and there was no
fire, then she wouldn’t have needed the policy.
b. [Uttered by Sue:] I know I probably wouldn’t have needed house
insurance (but I still really wish I’d bought some).
It seems hard to explain how these examples could be acceptable without
the similarity facts being as described.
To sum up, in this section we have seen that existing accounts of belief-
relative wishing are not sufficiently sensitive to decision-theoretic considera-
tions. This results in them not being able to handle examples that have the
structure of insurance cases. In the next section, we’ll consider the leading
decision-theoretic semantics for ‘want’. However, as we’ll see, this account
doesn’t carry over to wish reports.
2 Decision-theoretic wanting
It is worth repeating the Insurance Want scenario:
13This argument is similar to that run by Levinson (2003) against Heim’s comparative
desirability semantics for ‘want’.
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Insurance Want : Sue is deciding whether to take out house in-
surance. She estimates that the chances of her house burning
down are 11000 . But the results would be calamitous: she’d lose
her home which is valued at $1, 000, 000. Comprehensive home
insurance would cost her $100. Sue has a meeting with her in-
surance broker this afternoon, so she needs to decide what she
wants to do.
(2) Sue wants/hopes to buy insurance.
The most popular approach to reports such as (2) is Levinson’s (2003)
decision-theoretic semantics, which I’ll present here.14 Levinson uses no-
tions from evidential decision theory (Jeffrey, 1965). These concepts are
fairly standard, but I will introduce them briefly. On this approach, states
of belief are represented by subjective probability functions. These can be
expressed as ordered pairs 〈Doxw,S ,Cw,S〉. As before, Doxw,S ⊆ W repre-
sents the set of live doxastic possibilities for S in w. Levinson assumes for
simplicity, as we will as well, that W is finite.15 Cw,S is a function from B,
a Boolean algebra of subsets of W , to the unit interval. Cw,S represents S’s
credences over the live possibilities in w. Thus, Cw,S(Doxw,S) = 1; and for
disjoint p, q ∈ B, Cw,S(p ∪ q) = Cw,S(p) + Cw,S(q).
Evidential decision theory posits a revision operation on probability func-
tions, namely conditionalization. A probability function Cw,S can be revised
by conditioning on a proposition p consistent with Doxw,S . More explicitly,
if p ∩ Doxw,S 6= ∅, then Cw,S(q|p) is the probability function defined as
follows: Cw,S(q|p) = Cw,S(q ∩ p)/Cw,S(p). If p ∩ Doxw,S = ∅, then this op-
eration is undefined for Cw,S and p. Intuitively, Cw,S(w
′|p) is S’s credence
(in w) that w′ is the actual world, given that p is true.16
It is also assumed that a subject’s desires generate an evaluation function
vw,S , from W to the real numbers. Intuitively, vw,S(w
′) measures how much
utility S would get if w′ was the actual world. A notion of expected value







14Levinson was inspired by Goble’s (1996) account of deontic modals which employs a
notion of expected value. Levinson’s semantics is also endorsed by Lassiter (2011, 2010,
2017) and Jerzak (2019).
15Using infinite spaces would require more sophisticated techniques, e.g. integration,
but the essential points would remain unaffected.
16I’ll write C(w) instead of C({w}).
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The expected value of a proposition measures the utility provided by the
worlds in the proposition, weighted by the conditional probability of those
worlds being actual.
Levinson’s semantics then says that pS wants pq is true just in case S as-
signs a higher expected value to JpK than JpK (note that JpK now denotes a
proposition):
Decision-theoretic semantics for want
JS wants pKw = True iff EVw,S(JpK) > EVw,S(JpK))
To see how this account handles (2), let us represent Sue’s belief state as
follows (i is the proposition that Sue buys insurance, and f is the proposition

















Then EVSue(i) = vSue(w1)·CSue(w1|i)+vSue(w3)·CSue(w3|i) = −100·0.001+
−100 · 0.999 = −100. And EVSue(i) = vSue(w2) · CSue(w2|i) + vSue(w4) ·
CSue(w4|i) = −1, 000, 000 · 0.001 + 0 · 0.999 = −1, 000. Since −100 > −1000,
Levinson’s account predicts that (2) is true in Insurance.
By drawing on notions from evidential decision theory, Levinson’s seman-
tics is able to capture the way in which subjective probabilities impact the
truth of non-counterfactual desire ascriptions. However, it should be clear
that this account won’t carry over to counterfactual wish reports. Con-
sider (3) (‘Sue wishes she had bought house insurance’) in the Insurance
Wish scenario once again. Since Sue knows that she didn’t buy insurance,
her subjective probability that she bought insurance is 0, i.e. CSue(i) = 0.
Thus, one can’t conditionalize Sue’s subjective probability function on the
proposition that she bought insurance. This means that the expected value
of Sue buying insurance won’t be defined. Consequently, (3) will either be
false or undefined on a Levinson-style semantics for ‘wish’. In short: this
17I assume that CSue(i) = 0.5.
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semantics fails with fairly simple wish reports, let alone more complex ex-
amples such as (1) (‘Bill wishes that the person who robbed him had never
robbed anyone’).18
To sum up, in §1 we saw that existing accounts of wish reports that allow
for de credito readings can’t capture counterfactual insurance cases. This is
because these theories do not permit subjective probabilities to play a role in
determining what the subject desires. In the present section, we considered
the leading decision-theoretic account of non-counterfactual desire reports.
Although it is arguable that this account can capture want reports, this
semantics doesn’t carry over to wish reports, given its reliance on the notion
of expected value. Intuitively, what’s needed to capture wish reports is a
notion similar to expected value, but does not rely on revising probability
functions by conditionalization. I present such a concept in the next section,
and use it to develop a decision-theoretic account of wishing.
3 A probabilistic semantics for ‘wish’
In this section, I introduce the notion of revising a probability function by
imaging on a proposition (§3.1). Using this idea, I provide a preliminary
entry for ‘wish’ that can handle counterfactual insurance cases (§3.2). I then
extend the imaging operation so that it is defined relative to paired propo-
sitions, which allows us to capture belief-relative readings of wish reports
(§3.3). Finally, I discuss the presuppositions of wish reports, and present
my final entry for ‘wish’ (§3.4).
3.1 Imaging
As discussed in §2, evidential decision theorists define expected value in
terms of conditional probability. However, many argue that when it comes
to providing a theory of rational choice, this is the wrong notion of value to
use. More specifically, causal decision theorists maintain that defining ex-
pected value via conditionalization yields wrong results in so-called “New-
comb cases”.19 The basic idea in these cases is that how the agent acts
18Our argument assumes (i) that Sue should assign a credence of 0 to i in the Insurance
Wish scenario, and (ii) that if CSue(i) = 0, then any conditional expectation given i
is undefined. Both of these assumptions are fairly controversial in the decision-theory
literature; see for example (Hájek, 2003) and (Easwaran, 2019). However, lifting them
doesn’t substantially alter our conclusions. For instance, suppose that we allow CSue(·|i)
to be well-defined even though CSue(i) = 0. Then Sue will be nearly certain that she’s
suffering from serious memory loss, conditional on her having purchased insurance. Since
she very much doesn’t want to have those kinds of neurological issues, (3) will plausibly
still come out as false.
19See §4 for an example of such a case.
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provides them with information about what the world is like, even though
their actions do not cause the world to be in that state. Consequently, if
expected value is defined in terms of conditionalization, then in Newcomb
cases, agents can be advised to perform actions that indicate that the world
is a certain way, but are not maximally efficacious in bringing about desir-
able consequences. Causal decision theorists think that this is a problematic
result.20
In causal decision theory, the relevant notion of value isn’t defined in terms
of conditional probabilities, but rather “counterfactual” or “subjunctive”
probabilities (Joyce, 1999). This involves introducing a different type of
revision operation for probability functions. There are several ways of spec-
ifying this revision operation, but the one that will be useful for our purposes
is that of imaging.21 Roughly put, imaging a probability function C by a
proposition p, denoted Cp, shifts probability mass from worlds in the sam-
ple space where p is false, to the most similar worlds where p is true. To
make this precise, let us begin by defining the following class of indicator
functions:22
Indicator functions:
Given a world w, the indicator function for w, denoted ŵ(·), is
the unique probability function such that for all propositions p:
ŵ(p) = 1 if w ∈ p, and ŵ(p) = 0 otherwise.
An indicator function for w can be understood as representing a maximally
opinionated state of belief that w is the actual world. Given properties of
indicator functions, it can be established that for any probability function




C(w) · ŵ(p) (DEC)
In other words, any probability function can be “decomposed” into a
weighted sum of indicator functions.23 The idea is that when we image
20The literature on Newcomb problems and the evidential vs causal decision theory
debate is enormous. Some classic texts include (Nozick, 1969; Gibbard & Harper, 1978;
Lewis, 1981; Joyce, 1999). See, for example (Gallow, 2020) for more recent work.
21Imaging is discussed by (Gärdenfors, 1988; Joyce, 1999; Lewis, 1976, 1981; Sobel,
1994) among others.
22The exposition that follows is essentially from (Gärdenfors, 1988).
23Proof : By the law of total probability, for any probability function C and proposition
p, we have C(p) =
∑
w C(w) · C(p|w) (it is assumed that C(w) > 0, for all w). Now,
for any probability function C, proposition p, and world w: either C(p ∩ {w}) = C(w)
or C(p ∩ {w}) = 0. Now consider C(p|w) = C(p ∩ {w})/C(w). If w ∈ p, then C(p|w) =
C(w)/C(w) = 1; and if w 6∈ p, then C(p|w) = 0. Thus, C(·|w) = ŵ(·) and so C(p) =∑
w C(w) · ŵ(p).
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a probability function C by the proposition p, we essentially replace the
indicator functions ŵ in (DEC) by the indicator functions of the worlds
most similar to w. To this end, we will continue to assume that the simi-
larity function obeys the constraints from §1.3. In addition, it will simplify
our discussion if we assume that it obeys an additional constraint, namely
Uniqueness:
Uniqueness: Simw(p) contains at most one world
Given a world w and proposition p 6= ∅, let simw,p denote the unique world
in Simw(p). Then imaging can be defined as follows:
Imaging:
For any probability function C, and proposition p 6= ∅, the image






















w1 is a p-world, while both w2 and w3 are p-worlds. The arrows in the
first figure indicate the closest p-world from a given world. Thus, in imag-
ing C by p, the probability mass assigned to w1 gets shifted to w2. So,
for instance, C({w2, w3}) = C(w1) · ŵ1({w2, w3}) + C(w2) · ŵ2({w2, w3}) +
C(w3) · ŵ3({w2, w3}) = 0 + 0.1 + 0.4 = 0.5. But Cp({w2, w3}) = C(w1) ·
ŵ2({w2, w3})+C(w2)·ŵ2({w2, w3})+C(w3)·ŵ3({w2, w3}) = 0.5+0.1+0.4 =
1.
Hopefully the reader now has a decent grip on the imaging operation. Let




Using imaged probability functions, a notion similar to expected value from








To distinguish this notion from expected value, I’ll follow the literature and
call it expected utility (Gibbard & Harper, 1978).
The basic idea is to use the above notion of expected utility, rather than
expected value, in our semantics for wish reports. Let us assume for present
purposes that the complements in wish reports express propositions (and
not paired propositions). Then the thought is that pS wishes pq is true just
in case the expected utility of JpK, for S, is greater than the expected utility
of JpK.
Expected Utility Semantics for wish
JS wishes pKw = True iff EUw,S(JpK) > EUw,S(JpK)
Let us consider the truth-conditions this account generates for (3) (‘Sue
wishes she had bought house insurance’) in the Insurance Wish scenario.









Since Sue knows that she didn’t buy insurance, imaging CSue by the propo-
sition that she bought insurance (i) effectively just shifts the probability











Then EUSue(i) = vSue(w3) ·CiSue(w3) + vSue(w4) ·CiSue(w4) = −100 · 0.001 +
−100 · 0.999 = −100. Since Sue knows that she didn’t buy insurance, and
given Strong Centering, EUSue(i) = EUSue(>), where > is the tautology.
EUSue(>) = vSue(w1)·C>Sue(w1)+vSue(w2)·C>Sue(w2) = −1, 000, 000·0.001+
0 · 0.999 = −1000. Since −100 > −1000, (3) is predicted to be true, as
required.
3.3 Belief-relative desire again
The semantics presented in the previous section constitutes a step in the
right direction. However, as discussed in §1, our account of wish reports also
needs to be able capture belief-relative readings of these ascriptions. The
aim of this subsection is develop the account further so that it satisfies this
desideratum. I’ll first bring out an important feature of de credito readings
that constrains the space of viable theories of wishing (§3.3.1). Then I’ll
present my positive proposal that extends the definition of imaging (§3.3.2).
3.3.1 An important feature of belief-relativity
Recall that we are trying to capture reports such as (1) in contexts such as
the following:
Burgled Bill : Bill wakes up to find a trail of muddy footprints
leading to his study. Fearing the worst, he runs to his study
to check on his safe. He discovers the safe door open, and the
safe emptied of its contents. His valuable collection of silverware
is nowhere to be found. Given all of the evidence, Bill is quite
certain that he’s been burgled. As it happens, Bill wasn’t robbed.
His wife removed the silverware from the safe so that it could be
cleaned; and the muddy footprints belonged to Bill—he made
them unknowingly the night before.
(1) Bill wishes that the person who robbed him had never robbed any-
one.
Also recall that existing approaches maintain that the meaning of the com-
plement in (1) is a paired proposition. More specifically:
Meaning of complement in (1):
c∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who robbed Bill in
w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
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Since imaging has only been defined relative to sets of worlds, and not sets
of pairs of worlds, i.e. paired propositions, the account presented in §3.2
can’t capture (1). To make our approach to wish reports adequate, we
must incorporate paired propositions. What I want to bring out here is
an important constraint on such an attempt. This is most easily seen by
considering the following extension of the Burgled Bill story:
Thieving Pair : Bill also can’t find his laptop. For various reasons
he now believes that he was robbed by two people, rather than
just one. He thinks that the culprits are Joe and Steve, but
he isn’t sure who took what. Bill’s laptop is old and is insured
for much more than it’s worth, so unlike the situation with the
silverware, he’s happy about his laptop being gone. But Bill’s
laptop isn’t actually gone, it’s just hidden under a pile of books.
(6) a. Bill wishes that the person who stole his silverware had never
robbed anyone.
b. Bill wishes that the person who stole his laptop had never robbed
anyone.
On its de credito reading, (6a) is true. By contrast, (6b) is false. This is
significant because relative to Bill’s beliefs, the paired propositions expressed
by the complements in (6a) and (6b) output the same range of propositions.
More precisely, the complements in (6a) and (6b) denote the following paired
propositions:
Meaning of the complement in (6a):
s∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who stole Bill’s
silverware in w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
Meaning of the complement in (6b):
l∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who stole Bill’s laptop
in w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
We can suppose that Bill’s belief set is comprised of two worlds: w1, a world
where Steve steals Bill’s silverware and Joe steals Bill’s laptop; and w2, a
world where Joe steals Bill’s silverware and Steve steals Bill’s laptop. Then
s∗({w1, w2}) = {the proposition that Joe never robs anyone, the proposition
that Steve never robs anyone} = l∗({w1, w2}). Put another way, the image
(in the set-theoretic sense of “image”) of Bill’s belief set under s∗ is identical
to the image of Bill’s belief set under l∗. Nevertheless, the semantic values
of (6a) and (6b) diverge: the former is true but the latter is false.
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What this means is that wish reports do not supervene on the image (again,
in the set-theoretic sense of “image”) of the subject’s belief set under the rel-
evant paired proposition. This fact places substantive constraints on our the-
ory of wishing. It rules out straightforward attempts to incorporate paired
propositions into the decision theoretic semantics from §3.2. For instance,
one might have thought that paired propositions could simply be incorpo-
rated by running the expected utility check point-wise over the worlds in
the subject’s belief set: where JpK denotes a paired proposition, pS wishes
pq is true iff ∀w′ ∈ Dox : EU(JpK(w′)) > EU(JpK(w′)). But our observation
above shows that this entry won’t do. For example, it predicts that (6a) is
true iff (6b) is, which is a bad result. In short, it’s not just the range of a
paired proposition which matters; the functional relationships encoded by
paired propositions also play a role in shaping the truth-conditions of wish
reports. Our positive account needs to reflect this.
3.3.2 Imaging by paired propositions
My proposal is based on a revision operation on probability functions that
is defined directly in terms of paired propositions. I call this operation
imaging∗ to distinguish it from imaging:
Imaging∗:
For any probability function C, and paired proposition p∗ such
that p∗(w) 6= ∅ for all worlds w, the image of C by p∗, denoted
Cp
∗







In words: imaging∗ a probability function by a paired proposition p∗ shifts
probability mass from a world w to the nearest p∗(w)-world to w. Imaging∗
is a conservative extension of imaging in the following sense: whenever p∗
denotes a constant function, i.e. p∗(w) = p∗(w′), for all worlds w, w′, then
Cp
∗
(·) = Cp∗(w)(·), for any world w. The difference between these notions
comes out when p∗ is not a constant function, e.g. when p∗ is the meaning
of the complement clause in a belief-relative wish ascription. To illustrate,
suppose that Bill’s credence is evenly split between two worlds: w1, where




CBill(w1) = 0.5 R(Steve)
w2
CBill(w2) = 0.5
Consider once again the paired proposition expressed by the complement of
(1) (‘Bill wishes that the person who robbed him had never robbed anyone’):
Meaning of complement in (1):
c∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who robbed Bill in
w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
Now suppose that we image∗ Bill’s credences by c∗. This requires that for
each of Bill’s belief worlds w, we shift his credence from w to the closest
world to w where the person who robbed Bill at w never robbed anyone.
More specifically, we shift 0.5 of Bill’s credence from w1 to the closest world
to w1 where Joe never robs anyone; and we shift 0.5 of Bill’s credence from
w2 to the closest world to w2 where Steve never robs anyone. This can
be represented as follows, where w3 is the closest world to w1 where Joe











We can now define a variant of the notion of expected utility that takes











Then a semantics for wish reports that incorporates paired propositions can
be given (note that JpK denotes a paired proposition):24
24Officially, the condition on the right-hand side is EU∗w,S(JpK) > EU∗w,S(JpK), where
JpK is the set-theoretic complement of the paired proposition JpK with respect to W ×W .
But it is plausible that for the counterfactual notion of wishing at issue, w 6∈ JpK(w), for







Semantics for wish (to be revised)
JS wishes pKw = True iff EU∗w,S(JpK) > EUw,S(>)
This entry captures the essence of my proposal. For one thing, it handles all
of the examples handled by the account presented in §3.2, namely (3) (‘Sue
wishes she had bought house insurance’) in the Insurance Wish scenario. I
assume that the meaning of the complement in (3) is the following paired
proposition (see the discussion in §1.4):
Meaning of the complement in (3):
s∗(w′) = {w′′ | Sue buys insurance in w′′}
This is a constant function from any world to the set of worlds in which
Sue buys insurance. Hence, as remarked above, imaging∗ Sue’s probability
function by this paired proposition is equivalent to imaging her probability
function by the proposition, i.e. set of worlds, in which Sue buys insurance.
Thus, EU∗Sue(s
∗) = EUSue(i). So, since the account presented in §3.2 makes
(3) true, the semantics developed here will as well.























∗) = vBill(w3) ·Cc
∗
Bill(w3) + vBill(w4) ·Cc
∗
Bill(w4) = 0 · 0.5 + 0 · 0.5 = 0.
On the other hand, EUBill(>) = vBill(w1) ·C>Bill(w1)+vBill(w2) ·C>Bill(w2) =
−1000 · 0.5 +−1000 · 0.5 = −1000. Since 0 > −1000, (1) is predicted to be
true in the Burgled Bill scenario on its de credito reading.
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At this point, it is worth pausing to consider a concern raised by a reviewer.
The reviewer suggests that the most similar world to w1 where Joe never
robs anyone will be a world where someone still robs Bill. More specifically,
the most similar world to w1 where Joe never robs anyone is w2, the world
where Steve robs Bill. Similarly, the closest to w2 where Steve never robs
anyone is w1, the world where Joe robs Bill. In this case, the expected
utility∗ of c∗ will be equal to the expected utility of the tautology, and our
semantics incorrectly predicts that (1) should be false.
In response, it is important to distinguish between two different notions of
similarity. These notions link up with the distinction between indicative and
subjunctive supposition. To bring this out, consider Adams’s (1970) famous
pair of conditionals:
(7) a. If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.
b. If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.
These two sentences clearly differ in meaning. (7a) will be judged true by
anyone who believes that Kennedy was assassinated. By contrast, (7b) is
plausibly false, since it suggests that Kennedy’s assassination was inevitable.
This difference in meaning can be traced to distinct types of supposition that
are involved in the evaluation of each sentence, and thus distinct notions of
similarity. When we evaluate (7a), we engage in indicative supposition which
holds fixed our belief that Kennedy was assassinated. On this conception
of similarity, the most similar worlds where Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy are
ones where someone else did. By contrast, when we assess (7b) we engage in
subjunctive supposition which does not hold fixed our belief that Kennedy
was assassinated. On this notion of similarity, the most similar worlds where
Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy are not ones where Kennedy was killed anyway.
Now, if the proposition that Joe never robs anyone is taken as an indicative
supposition, then it is plausible that the most similar world to w1 where Joe
never robs anyone is w2, on the indicative notion of similarity. But it does
not follow that the most similar world to w1 where Joe never robs anyone is
w2, on the subjunctive notion of similarity. Indeed, we have good evidence
that the most “subjunctively” similar world to w1 where Joe never robs
anyone is a world where Bill isn’t robbed. For (8) is true in the Burgled Bill
scenario:
(8) Bill thinks that if the person who robbed him never robbed anyone,
then he would never have been robbed.
It is plausible that the notion of supposition relevant for wishing is subjunc-
tive supposition, and thus that the relevant notion of similarity is subjunc-
tive similarity. After all, although there is no tension between (9a) and (9b),
there is a clear tension between (9a) and (9c):
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(9) a. Mary wishes that Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy.
b. Mary thinks that if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else
did.
c. Mary thinks that if Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else
would have.
If Mary wishes that Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, then this will be because
she thinks that if Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, Kennedy wouldn’t have
been assassinated. But this contradicts (9c).25
If this is correct, then for the purposes of evaluating (1), the most similar
world to w1 where Joe never robs anyone will be w3, and the most simi-
lar world to w2 where Steve never robs anyone will be w4, just as I have
suggested.
Finally, the present proposal can distinguish between (6a) (‘Bill wishes that
the person who stole his silverware had never robbed anyone’) and (6b) (‘Bill
wishes that the person who stole his laptop had never robbed anyone’) in
the Thieving Pair scenario. Recall that the meaning of these clauses can be
expressed as follows:
Meaning of the complement in (6a):
s∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who stole Bill’s
silverware in w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}
Meaning of the complement in (6b):
l∗(w′) = {w′′ | there exists a unique person who stole Bill’s laptop
in w′, and this individual never robs anyone in w′′}











Imaging∗ CBill by s
∗ requires that for each of Bill’s belief worlds w, we
move probability mass from w to the closest world to w where the person
25Also note that if we stipulate that (8) is false in the Burgled Bill scenario, then (1)
starts to sound false as well.
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who stole Bill’s silverware at w never robs anyone. For instance, that we
move probability mass from w1 to the closest world to w1 in which Joe
never robs anyone. Importantly, Steve will still steal Bill’s laptop at this
closest world (this is world w5 below).
26 More generally, Bill’s revised belief















It is straightforward to check that the present semantics thus makes (6a)
true.
By contrast, imaging∗ CBill by l
∗ requires that we move probability mass
in a different way. For instance, that we move probability mass from w1
to the closest world to w1 where the person who stole Bill’s laptop at w1,
i.e. Steve, never robs Bill. But Joe will still steal Bill’s silverware at this
closest world (this is world w7 below). More generally, Bill’s revised belief















It is straightforward to check that the present semantics makes (6b) false.
Overall, the semantics developed above satisfies our central desideratum: it
provides an entry for ‘wish’ that can capture both insurance cases as well
as de credito readings of desire reports.27 A remaining issue concerns the
presuppositions of these ascriptions. I turn to this next.
26Note that if Bill came to believe that neither thief would have robbed him if one of
them didn’t, then it becomes much harder to detect any semantic difference between (6a)
and (6b). This is exactly what our account predicts.
27For simplicity, we have assumed that the similarity function obeys Uniqueness, i.e.
that for any proposition p and world w, there is a unique closest p-world to w. But if we
follow Gärdenfors (1982, 1988), we can develop our account in a way that doesn’t require
this assumption. If we drop Uniqueness, then we can define imaging∗ in two steps. First,
we define it relative to indicator functions:
Imaging∗ for indicator functions:
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3.4 The presuppositions of wish reports
Recall the Insurance Want scenario from earlier:
Insurance Want : Sue is deciding whether to take out house in-
surance. She estimates that the chances of her house burning
down are 11000 . But the results would be calamitous: she’d lose
her home which is valued at $1, 000, 000. Comprehensive home
insurance would cost her $100. Sue has a meeting with her in-
surance broker this afternoon, so she needs to decide what she
wants to do.
(2) Sue wants/hopes to buy insurance.
(3) # Sue wishes she had bought house insurance.
As discussed above, (2) is acceptable here, and plausibly true. By contrast,
(3) is unacceptable; the report suggests that the opportunity to buy insur-
ance has passed Sue by, which conflicts with the details of the case. The
problem is that our account of wish reports doesn’t predict any infelicity
here. Indeed, it is fairly straightforward to check that our account predicts
that (3) should be true, granted the assumptions of §2. In short, our pro-
posal makes counterfactual desire reports too similar to non-counterfactual
desire reports.
Theorists usually try to explain the contrast between (2) and (3) by saying
that pS wishes pq presupposes that S believes JpK. This stipulation might be
adequate in a setting where the complement to ‘wish’ denotes a proposition,
Given an indicator function ŵ and a paired proposition p∗, the image∗ of ŵ
by p∗ is a probability function ŵp
∗
(·) such that ŵp
∗
(p∗(w)) = 1, and for all
worlds w′: ŵp
∗
(w′) > 0 iff w′ ∈ Simw(p∗(w)).
We then define imaging∗ for arbitrary probability functions:
Imaging∗:
For any probability function C, paired proposition p∗, and world w, the
image of C by p∗, denoted Cp
∗


















Clause (i) tells us that the probability of a world w assigned by an imaged∗ function
is equal to the probability mass shifted to w as weighted by imaged∗ indicator functions.
Clause (ii) follows from (DEC) (§3.1). It is easily verified that the present definition of
imaging∗ collapses into the previous notion if we assume Uniqueness.
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i.e. set of worlds, but it doesn’t carry over to the two-dimensional setting.
This is because subjects don’t stand in the belief relation to paired proposi-
tions. In a two-dimensional framework, the requirement of counterfactuality
needs to be expressed in a more sophisticated way.
Where p∗ is a paired proposition, and ∆ is a set of worlds, let us say that p∗ is
counterfactual over ∆ just in case w 6∈ p∗(w), for all w ∈ ∆. I suggest that
wish reports carry the presupposition that the paired proposition expressed
by the complement is counterfactual over the subject’s belief set. Given that
the complement in (3) expresses the paired proposition below, this explains
why (3) is unacceptable in the Insurance Want scenario. This is because it
is compatible with what Sue believes that she buys insurance. Hence, for
some w ∈ DoxSue, w ∈ s∗(w), and so s∗ isn’t counterfactual over Sue’s belief
set.
Meaning of the complement in (3):
s∗(w′) = {w′′ | Sue buys insurance in w′′}
The final entry for ‘wish’ is then the following:28
Semantics for wish
JS wishes pKw is defined only if JpK is counterfactual over Doxw,S .
If defined, JS wishes pKw = True iff EU∗w,S(JpK) > EUw,S(>)
4 Desire reflection and backtracking
I’ll conclude by bringing out an ambiguity in wish reports, and briefly dis-
cussing what this means for some principles governing rational choice. Con-
sider the following Newcomb case adapted from Joyce (1999, 146-147):
Deposit : Suppose there is a brilliant (and very rich) psychologist
who knows Bill so well that she can predict his choices with a
high degree of accuracy. One Monday as Bill is on the way to the
banks she stops him, holds out a thousand-dollar bill, and says:
28Our account allows subjects to wish for outcomes that aren’t best by their lights. For
instance, suppose neither horse A nor horse B won the race. And suppose that if horse A
had won, you would have received $100; and if horse B had won, you would have received
$50. Then ‘You wish that horse B had won the race’ is predicted to be true, since horse
B winning (and thus receiving $50) is better for you than the status quo (you receiving
$0). Yet the report is unacceptable. More generally, it seems that subjects can only wish
for what is best. See Blumberg & Hawthorne forthcominga for further discussion of this
effect, and for a way to tweak decision-theoretic analyses of desire in order to capture it.
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“You may take this if you like, but I must warn you that there
is a catch. This past Friday I made a prediction about what
your decision would be. I deposited $1,000,000 into your bank
account on that day if I thought you would refuse my offer, but
I deposited nothing if I thought you would accept”. Bill accepts
the psychologist’s offer and takes the thousand-dollar bill. He
then checks his bank account, and, as expected, finds that there
has been no $1, 000, 000 deposit.
Consider (10):
(10) Bill wishes that he had refused the thousand-dollar bill.
Does (10) express a reasonable desire of Bill’s? On the one hand, one could
argue ‘no’, since Bill’s refusing the money made no difference to whether
a deposit had been made. It only would have resulted in Bill being $1000
poorer. This lines up with the acceptability of the following conditional:
(11) If Bill had refused the thousand-dollar bill, then there would still
have been no deposit into his account, and he’d have been $1000
poorer.
On the other hand, one could argue ‘yes’, since Bill’s refusing the money
means that the brilliant psychologist would have predicted this, and de-
posited $1, 000, 000 into Bill’s account. This sort of reasoning is captured
by the conditional (12):
(12) If Bill had refused the thousand-dollar bill, then this would have
been predicted by the psychologist, and she would have deposited
the money into Bill’s account.
So, there are (at least) two ways of taking wish reports. Our account can
make sense of this ambiguity. In contexts where (10) expresses a reasonable
desire of Bill’s, the similarity relation relevant for calculating expected util-
ity patterns with the “forward-looking” conditional (11), so that the most
similar worlds where Bill refuses the money are ones where there is still
no deposit. And in contexts where (10) does not express a reasonable de-
sire of Bill’s, the similarity relation relevant for calculating expected utility
patterns with the “backtracking” conditional (12), so that the most similar
worlds where Bill refuses the money are ones where a deposit has been made.
The availability of a backtracking interpretation of (10) marks something of
a divergence from causal decision theory, since on this approach to rational
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choice, the relevant similarity relation is always spelled out in terms of a
forward-looking, interventionist notion. According to causal decision theory,
there is no context where it is rational for Bill to refuse the thousand-dollar
bill if this makes no causal difference to whether the money is deposited
in the bank. Thus, although the theory of wishing and causal decision
theory both appeal to a notion of similarity, they differ in that the former’s
conception is less constrained than the latter’s.
This difference has significance for how we should understand so-called “de-
sire reflection principles” (Arntzenius, 2008). These principles demand that
the expectation value of future desirability must equal current desirability.
Put another way, one should not be such that one can foresee that one’s
future desires will differ from one’s current ones in such a way that one will
later regret earlier decisions. It has been argued that causal decision theory
satisfies desire reflection.29 But what our observations above suggest is that
this isn’t necessarily the case when desire is spelled out in terms of wishing:
there are contexts where Bill can reasonably wish that he had refused to take
the thousand-dollar bill, e.g. contexts where (12) is true, even though causal
decision theory dictates that Bill should always take the offer. This indi-
cates that causal decision theorists need to take some care care in how they
formulate these principles. More pointedly: just as causal decision theorists
maintain that backtracking counterfactuals fail to be probative with respect
to what a rational agent ought to choose in a given situation, they should
also set to one side backtracking desires when interpreting desire reflection
principles.
Appendix
Here I outline one approach to representing paired propositions at logical
form, namely Blumberg’s (2018) account. Blumberg builds on the frame-
work that posits syntactically realized world pronouns. World pronouns
were introduced as an alternative to scopal accounts of the de dicto/de re
distinction. They were designed to get the relevant readings without move-
ment, and solve other problems as well.30 Each predicate at LF is assigned
an index—wi, where i is a natural number—that indicates the world relative
to which the predicate is to be evaluated. For instance, teacherw7 indicates
that the predicate ‘teacher’ should be evaluated at world w7. Thus, when
we evaluate teacherw7 we will get the set of teachers at w7.
29See, e.g. (Arntzenius, 2008). Arntzenius ultimately rejects causal decision theory, but
for reasons unrelated to desire reflection.
30See (von Fintel & Heim, 2011, 102-110) for an introduction to the world pronouns
approach, and (Keshet, 2008) for a more detailed discussion.
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To get a feel for how the system works, here is how the de dicto reading
((13b)) and the de re reading ((13a)) of (13) would be represented:
(13) Bill believes the person who robbed him dances.
a. λw1 Bill believesw1 [λw2 [the person-who-robbed-Billw1
dancew2 ]]
b. λw1 Bill believesw1 [λw2 [the person-who-robbed-Billw2
dancew2 ]]
In this system, pronoun binders appear at the top of sentences, and a sen-
tence, φ, is true at a world, w, just in case JφK(w) = 1. Let us assume, as is
standard, that at each world w, a subject S is assigned a belief set, denoted
Doxw,S , which contains all of the worlds compatible with everything that
S believes at w. When (13a) is evaluated at the actual world, w@, only
‘believes’ is evaluated at w@ (giving us Bill’s belief set at w@)—‘person who
robbed Bill’ (and ‘dance’) is evaluated relative to Bill’s belief worlds (i.e.
those worlds in Bill’s belief set at w@). This gives us the de dicto reading.
By contrast, when (13b) is evaluated at w@, both ‘believes’ and ‘person who
robbed Bill’ are evaluated there. The extension of ‘person who robbed Bil’
at the actual world is the set of individuals that actually robbed Bill, giving
us the de re reading.
Blumberg extends the world pronoun approach by allowing two pronoun
binders to appear at the top of embedded clauses rather than just one. This
allows these clauses to represent paired propositions. For instance, on the
de credito reading of (1) (‘Bill wishes that the person who robbed him had
never robbed anyone’), the LF of the complement looks as follows:
(14) λw1λw2 [the person-who-robbed-Billw1 never-rob-anyonew2 ]
The de dicto, de re, and de credito readings of (1) (‘Bill wishes that the
person who robbed him had never robbed anyone’) are then represented as
follows, respectively:
(15) a. λw1 Bill wishesw1 [λw2 λw3 [the person-who-robbed-Billw3
never-rob-anyonew3 ]
b. λw1 Bill wishesw1 [λw2 λw3 [the person-who-robbed-Billw1
never-rob-anyonew3 ]
c. λw1 Bill wishesw1 [λw2 λw3 [the person-who-robbed-Billw2
never-rob-anyonew3 ]
Constraints on world pronoun binding (Percus, 2000; Keshet, 2008) prevent
the system from overgenerating readings. For instance, logical forms such
as (16) are ruled out by Percus’s “Generalization X”:
32
(16) λw1 Bill wishesw1 [λw2 λw3 [the person-who-robbed-Billw3 never-
rob-anyonew2 ]
Generalization X (Percus, 2000):
The world variable that the main verb selects for must be coin-
dexed with the nearest λ above it.
Clearly, this blocks (16), since the main verb in the complement is ‘never-
rob-Bill’, and this verb isn’t coindexed with the nearest λ above it.
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